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Abstract 
Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami all roads in the affected areas in Sri Lanka were 
inaccessible during the immediate aftermath of the disaster either due to the damages they 
sustained or poor networking of roads and lack of contingency planning within the road 
network systems. This paper aims at proving the necessity of effective mainstreaming of 
disaster risk reduction during road reconstruction as a basic precondition for reduced exposure 
of road structures to hazards; improved resistance of road structures; improved resilience of 
authorities/teams involved in road projects. It presents the experiences of the road 
reconstruction sector in Sri Lanka following the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The paper 
discusses the perceptions of the key project stakeholders on mainstreaming disaster risk 
reduction and the effects of mainstreaming disaster risk reduction on vulnerability reduction. 
The study was empirically supported by the case study approach and independent expert 
interviews. This paper only presents the analysis of one case study which was conducted in a 
post-tsunami road reconstruction project in the Southern Sri Lanka, out of two case studies 
conducted within the study.  
The results of the study demonstrate that vulnerabilities of road project’s structures and 
authorities/teams involved in road projects must be paid the key attention when mainstreaming 
disaster risk reduction. Although the disaster risk reduction strategies such as 
physical/technical, emergency preparedness and knowledge management strategies are 
considered to be very important to make road structures more disaster resistance and 
authorities/teams more disaster resilience, they are not integrated into the case study project up 
to the required level except the physical/technical strategies. The paper concludes that although 
the importance of effective mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction during road reconstruction 
has been considerably identified by the individuals, adequate attention had not been given at the 
project planning and design phases to make it a project priority due to a range of internal and 
external hindrances.  
Keywords: Road reconstruction, Disaster risk reduction, Vulnerability reduction 
1. Background of the study 
Sri Lanka became one of the worst affected countries with a very large death toll and losses in 
housing and infrastructure by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. It washed over the coastlines of 
many countries; and killed more than 35,000 people and displaced nearly 2,500,000 people in 
Sri Lanka. The tsunami devastated the coastal infrastructure in Sri Lanka: roads, railways, 
power, telecommunications, water supplies and fishing ports, which were already in a seriously 
debilitated condition due to the ethnic conflict, maintenance negligence, lack of development 
investment and the effects of high rainfall and flooding in recent years (ADB, 2005; ADB et 
al., 2005). The damage to Sri Lanka’s infrastructure is estimated to be over US Dollars 1.7 
billion (Gunasekara, 2006). Erosion damage occurred on sections of the coastal highway 
network and a number of roads were damaged or completely washed away. The road transport 
from Colombo to Hambantota in the South and some parts of the Puttalam district were badly 
damaged. Approximately eight hundred (800) kilometres of national roads together with 
approximately one thousand five hundred (1,500) kilometres of provincial and local 
government roads located in the North, East and South of the country were damaged by the 
force of the tsunami (GoSL, 2005; RADA, 2006a; RADA, 2006b).  
2. Why mainstreaming disaster risk reduction into road 
reconstruction? 
Outcomes of post-disaster reconstruction projects in developing countries are often criticised 
for their lack of design efficacy, quality of construction, cost effectiveness and time taken for 
completion of rebuilding. On the other hand, it is often suggested in the literature that 
reconstruction must take into account the implications of reducing disaster vulnerability in the 
long-term because lack of disaster risk reduction initiatives within post-disaster reconstruction 
results in major failures in reconstruction projects, subjecting them to high vulnerabilities even 
to small scale future disasters (for example in Jigyasu, 2002). As far as infrastructure is 
concerned, it is evident from the literature that there are many problems associated with post-
disaster reconstruction in terms of its ability to achieve socio-economic development needs 
following major disasters which needs proper attention to find the necessary solutions. This 
need was sufficiently highlighted in the post-tsunami reconstruction following the tsunami 2004 
in Sri Lanka. The South Asian Disaster Report, ‘Tackling the Tides and Tremors’, by Wisner et 
al. (2005) questions whether recovery is used to address disparities in quality and access of 
infrastructure and services to communities, to what extent infrastructure re-development would 
extend towards and deal with issues related to infrastructure and services needs in poorer 
communities, reconcile environmental-development complexities and link development to 
future disaster risk management because it is found that issues of varying vulnerabilities, 
people’s needs and access to infrastructures are not well articulated in post-tsunami 
infrastructure reconstruction plans in Sri Lanka. Therefore, it can be presumed that 
reconstruction process can be improved by the integration of DRR strategies that may result in 
vulnerability reduction and ultimately on development. 
The concept of “disaster risk reduction” (DRR) has taken its momentum due to severe loss of 
lives and property resulting from the recent natural and human induced disasters. DRR can be 
defined as a means of tackling the fundamental elements of disaster risk: vulnerability and 
hazards (DFID, 2006); hence it brings about measures to hold back disaster losses by 
addressing hazards and the vulnerability of social and physical environments. Although many 
people tend to appreciate structural or technically advanced strategies (‘hard engineering 
measures’) soft methods such as polices, planning and knowledge management strategies also 
form part of DRR strategies (Mileti, 1999; Weichselgartner 2001). There are a range of 
classifications of DRR strategies where all of them mostly address policy and planning 
strategies; physical/technical prevention/mitigation strategies (such as engineering and 
construction measures); emergency preparedness strategies; natural protection strategies; and 
knowledge management strategies. Table 1 is an outcome generated from an analysis of various 
classifications of DRR strategies and the table is mainly developed focusing on road 
reconstruction projects.  
Table 1: DRR strategies that can be adopted in road (re)construction projects 
Policy and planning strategies 
National level legal arrangements that govern enactment and enforcement of construction 
policies/guidelines/regulations 
Requirement for organisational level policy/guidelines for planning and implementation of DRR  
Mechanisms to maintain appropriate standards of reliability of infrastructure 
Hazard assessment/analysis 
Vulnerability assessment/analysis  
Procedures for conducting infrastructure risk assessment/analysis 
Assessment of potential of loss of infrastructure services during disasters 
Damage assessment to assess effectiveness of previous mitigation measures 
Physical/technical strategies 
Land use planning/buffer zones for reconstruction 
Construction of raised roads 
Construction of drainage systems/drainage pumps for roads 
Construction of flood defences (e.g. sea walls) alongside road networks 
Construction of robust concrete roads 
Emergency preparedness strategies 
Contingency mechanisms for coping with disasters (e.g. escape roads) 
Pre-positioning/strategic stock piling of relief material (e.g. life boats, life jackets, tools, first aid) 
Regular maintenance of road project after reconstruction  
Construction professionals’ (project participants) disaster preparedness after reconstruction 
Integrated warning and response system 
Natural protection strategies 
Reforestation of watersheds/replanting of vegetation  
Knowledge management strategies 
Project participants’ engagement in training & education/awareness programmes on infrastructure safety   
Community engagement in training and education/awareness programmes on infrastructure safety 
Community engagement in project decision making and physical reconstruction 
Women’s engagement in project decision making and physical reconstruction 
Communication, information management and sharing inside the project 
Communication, information management and sharing outside the project 
 
Hazard is a natural or man-made phenomenon. Although man-made hazards such as bomb 
blasts in which there is an element of human intent, negligence, error or involving a failure of a 
system (Eshghi and Larson, 2008) are preventable/controllable the natural hazards are evidently 
the opposite of it. A few examples for natural hazards are cyclones, tsunamis, earthquakes and 
volcanic eruptions. Due to the nature of exclusively of natural origin, the only means to 
prevent/reduce the potential risk (loss) generated by such hazards is through addressing the 
vulnerability of social (e.g. communities) and physical environments (e.g. buildings, 
infrastructure). Therefore, it is clear that DRR strategies pre-dominantly focus on the aspects of 
vulnerabilities in the context of natural disasters.  
There is a no common consensus between the practitioners, policy makers and the researchers 
about the exact meaning of “vulnerability”. Majority of definitions are weak in one or the other 
way due to lack of comprehensiveness of the overall aspects covered within them. Although it 
should address both social and physical environments most of the definitions fail to do so. 
Fairly meaningful definition had been presented by the UN/ISDR (2004) which pronounces 
vulnerability as the “degree of exposure of the population/property and its capacity to prepare 
for and respond to the hazard”. McEntire (2001) defines vulnerability as a product of four 
components: risk, susceptibility, resistance and resilience (see Figure 1) which exist either in 
physical (e.g. natural systems, built environmental structures and technological structures) or 
social environment (e.g. individuals, groups of individuals, cultural systems, political systems 
and economic systems).  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Components of vulnerability (Source: McEntire, 2001) 
The terms risk, susceptibility, resistance and resilience are described by McEntire (2001) as 
follows: 
 Proximity or exposure to hazards which increases the probability of disaster losses put 
the physical environment at risk.  
 Social, political, economic, and cultural forces and activities that determine the 
proneness of individuals and groups to being adversely affected by disasters makes 
social environment more susceptible to hazards. 
 Physical environment’s ability to resist the damage imposed by hazards is called 
resistance (Norton and Chantry, 1993) 
 The capacity of the social environment to cope or the ability to react or effectively 
recover from a hazard that becomes disastrous is called resilience of social 
environments (Buckle et al., 2000; Mileti, 1999). 
Since the term ‘risk’ already has a different meaning than exposure, it can be replaced with a 
more meaningful term such as ‘fragility’. Since all four components of vulnerability are formed 
either due to the nature and level of exposure or capacity of the respective environment, DRR 
should be aimed at:  
 eliminating/reducing the exposure to hazards; and  
 improving the capacity (capacity has two attributes called resistance and resilience) 
These four components of vulnerability are usually determined by numerous variables which 
can be categorised under physical, social, cultural, political, economic and technological 
headings (more details are available in the analysis section of this manuscript). It is a matter of 
Physical 
(including natural, built, 
technological) 
Social 
(including cultural, 
political, economic) 
technological) 
Liabilities 
Capabilities 
Environmental 
attributes 
Environment 
collecting and analysing meaningful empirical evidences to demonstrate which variables 
address the fragility, susceptibility, resistance and resilience components of vulnerability and 
how effective the mainstreaming of DRR into road reconstruction in improving resistance of 
road structures; improving resilience of road reconstruction teams (the authorities); and 
reducing their exposure to hazards.  
3. Research Methodology 
In order to empirically test the mainstreaming of DRR during road reconstruction and their 
effect on vulnerability reduction of the road structures, road authorities and individuals 
involved in reconstruction, a case study was carried out which was supported by independent 
expert interviews. The case study was conducted in a post-tsunami road reconstruction project 
in the Southern Sri Lanka. This project was begun with the aim of rehabilitating the tsunami 
affected roads in the Galle, Marata and Hambantota districts; three of the worst affected areas. 
The project has mainly undertaken reconstruction work in class C, D, E roads, urban and rural 
roads which are managed by the provincial councils, urban councils and the local councils. The 
project did not involve reconstruction of a single network of roads because most of the affected 
roads were spread around the districts.  
The case study consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews and a questionnaire survey. 
The semi-interview guideline was prepared with the aim of capturing the respondents’ 
knowledge and experience on the level of mainstreaming DRR into the road project and the 
existing vulnerabilities of the road project once it is fully reconstructed. Five (5) semi-
structured interviews were conducted among the project officials. A questionnaire survey was 
conducted as a supplementary technique to semi-structured interviews which enabled the same 
issue to be investigated quantitatively. The data were collated from six questionnaire 
respondents.   
4. Analysis of empirical data and discussion 
4.1 Vulnerability of road reconstruction project 
The level of vulnerability of the road project was identified using the likert scale denoted 
below associated with the questionnaire survey.  
1 and below =  Not present at all; 1 to 2 =  Present to a very little extent; 2 to 3 =  
Somewhat present; 3 to 4 =  Present; 4 to 5 =  Present to a great extent 
 
The mean values of each factor forming vulnerabilities and total mean values of each type of 
vulnerabilities within the road project were then computed which are shown in Table 2. As 
shown there, the questionnaire survey analysis revealed that various vulnerabilities exist within 
the road reconstruction project at different levels due to presence of a number of factors 
forming such vulnerabilities. For example, economic vulnerabilities (mean 3.44) were 
identified as the most critical type among all 6 categories, indicating it is ‘present’ within the 
project. The next highest recorded vulnerabilities are physical (mean 2.78), political (mean 
2.50), technological (mean 2.17) and cultural (mean 2.11) indicating they are ‘somewhat 
present’ within the project. Social vulnerabilities are ‘present to a very little extent’ (mean 
2.00). 
Table 2: Vulnerabilities of road reconstruction project 
Types of 
vulnerabilities Factors forming road reconstruction project vulnerabilities Mean 
Total 
mean 
Physical  
Proximity of road reconstruction project to natural hazards 3.00 
2.78 Degradation of the environment due to the road reconstruction 
project 2.67 
Interdependencies of road project on other infrastructures (two 
or more infrastructures depend on each other) 2.67 
Technological  
Project participants’ over-reliance upon or ineffective warning 
systems  2.00 
2.17 
Project participants’ inadequate foresight regarding new 
technology for reconstruction 1.67 
Interdependencies of road project on other infrastructures (two 
or more infrastructures depend on each other) 2.67 
Lack of detailed planning and structural mitigation of road 
reconstruction project 2.33 
Social  
Project participants’ limited education (including insufficient 
knowledge) about disasters 2.00 2.00 
Marginalisation of specific project participants (e.g. women) 2.00 
Cultural  
Project participants’ objection to safety precautions and 
regulations 1.67 
2.11 Dependency and absence of personal responsibility within road 
reconstruction project 2.33 
Project participants’ carelessness/inadequate foresight 
regarding design and reconstruction of road project 
considering the consequences of disasters  
2.33 
Political  
Minimal support for disaster programmes amongst elected 
officials  2.67 
2.50 
 
Inability to enforce or encourage steps for mitigation within 
road project 2.33 
Over-centralisation of decision making within road project 2.33 
Isolated or weak disaster related institutions related to road 
reconstruction 2.67 
Economic  
Lack of funding and resources for disaster prevention, planning 
and management within road reconstruction project 2.33 
3.44 Failure to purchase insurance against potential economic 
losses of road reconstruction project 5.00 
Project participants’ pursuit of profit with little regard for 
consequences 3.00 
 4.2 Mainstreaming DRR for reduced exposure and improved 
resistance of road structures and improved resilience of project 
teams 
This section presents the data analysis and discussion on the effects of mainstreaming DRR into 
the road project on vulnerability reduction of the project. The section addresses three types of 
vulnerabilities: physical, technological and political (social, cultural and economic 
vulnerabilities are not covered within this paper).  
4.2.1 Physical vulnerabilities  
Semi-structured interview and questionnaire survey findings identified the same set of factors 
as listed in Table 2, but interviews called upon an additional factor called ‘problems with 
acquisition of land’. Factors forming physical vulnerabilities mainly lead to increased exposure 
of road structures to natural hazards and sometimes to reduced resistance of road structures 
itself. How far mainstreaming DRR into the case study project had been able to address the 
physical vulnerabilities is discussed below: 
 The existing ground and road levels of this project are below that of the sea level and 
the road is located very close to the sea where certain parts are regularly subject to 
flooding for various reasons, proving the factor the ‘proximity of road reconstruction 
project to natural hazards’. Although a DRR strategy such as land use planning would 
provide a better solution for the problem it has become impossible in a reconstruction 
project like this as it involves shifting/re-routing roads. Such an action is not something 
to be decided and enacted by the local authorities or at the project level unless the 
national governmental level provisions are in place in this regard. The Sri Lankan 
government attempted to implement a rule called buffer zones for reconstruction after 
the tsunami 2004 disaster by prohibiting all construction within close proximity to the 
sea. It started with 100 feet from the sea, later reduced to 35 feet, but finally became a 
poorly functional rule and was abandoned. The next solution is ‘raised roads which is a 
strategy implemented within this project to the extent of its importance.  
 In raising roads, the interview respondents stated that the roads were not raised 
considerably, as the most economic solution for flood prone areas is not raising roads, 
but installation of proper drainage systems. ‘Construction of flood defences (e.g. sea 
walls) alongside road networks’ is another useful physical/technical strategy in this 
regard, but it had not been attended at all by the road project. The other most important 
strategy is ‘contingency mechanisms for coping with disasters (escape roads)’, but is 
also not adequately implemented within the project. The project had not been 
undertaken as a network of roads or interconnected roads. Therefore, the possibility of 
identifying alternative or escape roads in case of disaster became difficult and 
impossible. Moreover, some interview respondents believed that such alternative routes 
are not a must in rural roads as it is normally in the case of major roads.  
 Interdependencies of the roads (projects) with other infrastructures and infrastructure 
sectors can occur during their normal functioning, disaster situations and 
reconstruction. For example, high geographical interdependency of the case study road 
(project) (two or more infrastructures are located in the same area that can be affected 
by a local event) with other infrastructures (sectors) such as communications, 
electricity, and water resulted in severe reconstruction delays due to overlap in 
reconstruction and delayed implementation of initially drafted road designs. As a result 
of the latter issue, the initial designs became out-dated by the time of their 
implementation as the road conditions changed from subsequent small scale disasters, 
such as floods which took place following the tsunami 2004, leaving the already 
damaged roads and roads being reconstructed more exposed future hazards. On the 
other hand, major impacts of natural disasters on critical infrastructure could result in 
secondary impacts on functions and services of associated industries in the affected 
areas because of their inevitable geographical interdependency from one to another. 
This is something to be focused on during reconstruction in order to prevent/minimise 
effects of future disasters on interdependent infrastructure. Although DRR strategy 
called ‘communication, information management and sharing outside the project’ 
could have been the most effective strategy in this regard, since the project had not had 
timely and effective communication between other relevant infrastructure sectors (e.g. 
telecommunication, electricity), interdependencies have negatively affected the efficacy 
of the final outcome of the project. Although the interview respondents stated that 
communication was taking place with the external authorities such as local authorities 
in designing the project it had not been sufficient to overcome the negative effects of 
infrastructure interdependencies during reconstruction or when the reconstructed roads 
are made available to the public for use.    
4.2.2 Technological vulnerabilities  
Semi-structured interview findings identified an additional factor called ‘existing structures’ as 
a factor forming technological vulnerabilities, apart from the factors listed in Table 2. These 
factors mainly led to reduced resistance of road structures to natural hazards, as well as 
sometimes to increased exposure to natural hazards. How far mainstreaming DRR into the case 
study project had been able to address the technological vulnerabilities is discussed below: 
 Although the project had used new technologies to a certain extent to improve the 
structural stability (e.g. new road surfacing systems), use of more advanced 
technologies had become limited due to financial problems and project participants’ 
inadequate foresight regarding new technology for reconstruction at the project 
inception, because the roads in question had been initially managed by the provincial 
and local governments who normally suffer from lack of professionally qualified 
engineers with adequate technical knowledge. Although the ‘project participants’ 
engagement in training and education/awareness programmes on infrastructure safety’ 
is a very important knowledge management DRR strategy to overcome the lack of skills 
for new technology this strategy had not been adequately implemented in the project. 
Although most of the interview respondents agreed that there were some capacity 
building programmes, they too questioned their adequacy given the fact that this project 
was initiated as a capacity building project for local authorities and southern provincial 
administrative authorities. Moreover, it was revealed that the opportunities opened up 
for employees from the contractors’ side for this kind of training programmes were 
very minimum. As a solution for ‘project participants’ inadequate foresight regarding 
new technology for reconstruction’, the experts suggested the importance of being 
familiar with the local construction technologies, design features and construction 
materials in order to overcome unnecessary reliance on new technologies which would 
not necessarily suit the local context. It can be achieved through ‘community 
engagement in decision making and physical reconstruction’. 
 Apart from the high interdependencies described above, it was further ascertained that 
the project was technologically vulnerable due to its cyber interdependency of 
information transmitted through information and communication infrastructures. Cyber 
interdependencies mainly affected communication just before, during and immediately 
after the tsunami, in receiving disaster warnings and in responding to the hazard, 
leading to increased exposure of the road structures to the tsunami hazard. As a result 
the opportunities for protecting the road structures from the tsunami were lost as no 
emergency preparedness and immediate response could take place within the road 
authorities. This problem will be further continued as the reconstruction project did no 
pay sufficient attention to resolving it targeting at future hazards. The expert interviews 
also highlighted the importance of establishing integrated warning systems, regular 
upgrades of warning systems, proper lines of communication (collaborative approach 
between infrastructure authorities) when warning systems are activated which 
themselves are means of creating cyber interdependencies between infrastructures and 
the relevant authorities. This is where the importance of ‘communication, information 
management and sharing outside the project’ appears as part and parcel of 
reconstruction and post-reconstruction, given its ability to establish lines of 
communication through proper coordination with the relevant external entities appear. 
These would positively help overcome the technological vulnerabilities; however, the 
case study project in focus had not gone into that extent in adopting integrated warning 
systems or collaborative approaches to prevent future disasters through information 
sharing. Discontinuity of personnel and authorities involved in reconstruction for the 
operational phase of the road structures (including maintenance) would make the 
reconstructed structures more technologically vulnerable as the officials in-charge of 
operation and maintenance may have different understanding and mind-set about 
minimising disaster risks than the officials who were originally engaged in the 
reconstruction.  
 ‘Lack of detailed planning and structural mitigation of road reconstruction project’ 
directly affects the resistance capacity of the road structures. It was realised that most 
of the initial project designs lacked sufficient structural details due to ‘project 
participants’ carelessness/ inadequate foresight’, their ‘lack of knowledge’, ‘pursuit of 
profit’ and ‘insufficient data and information’. For example, the feasibility studies had 
been conducted based on a very little initial data available after the tsunami. Only a few 
studies had been conducted before starting the detailed designs – e.g. studies on issues 
such as present usage and future expected usage of roads, but no adequate vulnerability, 
hazard and risk assessments were conducted. In interview respondents’ opinion, the 
reason is attributed to the impossibility to carry out project planning to a great extent in 
reconstruction projects as normally done in new construction projects. As explained 
above, although the ‘project participants’ engagement in training and 
education/awareness programmes on infrastructure safety’ is a very important 
knowledge management DRR strategy to overcome the problem of  ‘lack of 
knowledge’, but this strategy had not been adequately implemented.  
4.2.3 Political vulnerabilities  
Political vulnerabilities would initially reduce the resilience of the project team and 
subsequently affect the disaster resistance capacity of the road structures. Four factors have 
contributed to political vulnerabilities: ‘minimal support for disaster programmes amongst 
elected officials’, ‘inability to enforce or encourage steps for mitigation within road project’, 
‘over-centralisation of decision making within road project’, and ‘isolated or weak disaster 
related institutions related to road reconstruction’, according to the questionnaire survey 
findings. However, the interviews identified only two factors within this area: 
 Due to budgetary constraints, the project had to select the highest priority roads for 
reconstruction. The priority lists had been prepared by the provincial and local 
governments that resulted in an added political interferences to the selection procedures 
of roads for reconstruction. Accordingly, the project had undertaken tsunami affected 
as well as unaffected roads. Thus, some roads which were substantially affected by the 
tsunami had been neglected due to ‘minimal support for disaster programmes amongst 
elected officials’.   
 The ‘inability to enforce or encourage steps for mitigation within road project’ was 
identified, again due to political interferences on the project. As noted, sometimes the 
project officials had not been given the opportunity to plan it unrestricted; changes took 
place even during the construction phase, for example; certain roads were removed 
from the project after physical reconstruction had commenced on the site. Although the 
structural designs of the project were not influenced by the political problems, the 
overall project planning was affected by political issues. On the other hand, as noted by 
the interview respondents there was no proper political support to acquire the most 
critical lands to establish the road boundaries and drainage systems. Apart from that, 
the project funder’s regulations have prohibited the project from acquiring lands from 
communities. In this way, the road reconstruction project experienced the ‘inability to 
enforce or encourage steps for mitigation within road project’ due to ‘minimal support 
for disaster programmes amongst elected officials’ and policies and regulations not 
permitting such mitigatory actions.  
Most factors forming political vulnerabilities of reconstruction projects are out of the project 
control. If there were clear-cut ‘national and intermediate-organisational protocols’, special 
‘organisational arrangements that govern enactment and enforcement of various national and 
intermediate-organisational protocols’ and ‘organisational policies, guidelines for planning 
and implementation of disaster risk reduction strategies’ this problem could have been avoided 
to a certain extent. Since ‘minimal support for disaster programmes amongst elected officials’ 
can take place due to an imbalance of many factors such as lack of economic resources, lack of 
ability and knowledge, in experts view, improving communication, information management 
and sharing outside the project (e.g. political agencies) is another strategy that road 
reconstruction projects can use to resolve this matter.  
5. Conclusions 
The existing vulnerabilities of road reconstruction projects can be described in a descending 
order of economic, physical, political, technological, cultural and social vulnerabilities. The 
results of the study demonstrate that existing vulnerabilities of disaster affected roads’, road 
authorities and individuals involved in those reconstruction projects must be paid a key 
attention when mainstreaming DRR. Thus, ‘vulnerability reduction’ can be defined as an 
enabler that facilitates the process of mainstreaming DRR. Although the DRR strategies such as 
policy and planning; physical/technical; emergency preparedness; and knowledge management 
strategies are considered to be very important to make road structures more disaster resistance, 
authorities/teams more disaster resilience and both less exposed to hazards, they are not 
adequately mainstreamed into the project up to the required level.  
The case study being a project involved in reconstruction of provincial and local roads, there 
were less application of policy and planning strategies such as national policies, design 
guidelines, regulations, and organisational level policy/guidelines. Although the feasibility 
studies had been carried out to a certain extent, mostly the case study project did not receive 
sufficient funding for detailed planning activities such as hazard mapping, vulnerability 
assessments, risk assessments, disaster impact assessments etc., activities which are directly 
related to DRR and it is therefore unusual for mainstreaming DRR to be a top project priority at 
the early stages of project preparation. However, the study reveals that the key to successful 
mainstreaming of DRR into road reconstruction is planning and design phases.  
The study further reveals that although the importance of effective mainstreaming of DRR into 
road reconstruction has been considerably identified by individual team members, adequate 
attention had not been given at the project planning and design phases to make it a project 
priority. This is mainly due to various external factors such as political and economic 
restrictions which are out of the project’s controlling capacity and internal factors such as 
socio-cultural variables (limited education about effects of hazards, dependency and absence of 
personal responsibility etc.). As far as the internal factors are concerned, while some of the 
project team members consider mainstreaming DRR as an alien concept some of them do not 
bring a serious negative attitude towards it. However, majority of them are not ready to accept 
it as a project priority due to their narrow minded thinking of mainstreaming DRR as 
something alien and not bearable for developing countries like Sri Lanka. Principally, they are 
morally getting demotivated due to these external factors explained above.  
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